
The Herreshoff Brothers and their Torpedo Boats, Part X
A series of papers on bringing innovation to the "New Navy"

Success
Torpedo Boats 6 & 7 | 1895-1897
by John Palmieri
See on-line THE HERRESHOFF CATALOGUE RAISONNÉ for detailed information on HMCo. # vessels including photos, half model images and descriptive documents
Introduction
The brothers change strategy by entering into an initially confidential agreement with the Secretary of the Navy to build faster vessels, free from Bureau oversight. They deliver superior vessels, but in the process risk any future constructive relationship with the Bureaus.
The Series will end with two more segments.
● Part XI detailing the disastrous failure of Herreshoff to win a contract for a 30-knot TB. The success of TBs 14, 15 & 16; models of economy of construction and operation, followed by Herreshoff bidding failure and departure from the torpedo boat business.
● A Postscript addressing Capt. Nat’s brief reengagement with his US Navy torpedo boat supporters to provide the administration of President Theodore Roosevelt an improved class of destroyers.
Contracting for TBs 6, 7 & 8
Congress Authorizes Construction
On March 2, 1895, Congress approves construction of three torpedo boats at a unit cost not to exceed $175,000. Subtracting US Navy costs for superintending construction, preparing plans and specifications, procuring and installing Government furnished armament, the bid price is expected near $150,000. Congress restricts construction to one contractor each, on the Pacific Coast, the Mississippi River, and the Gulf of Mexico, unless the bids show they cannot be built at a fair cost, in which case the decision is left to the Secretary of the Navy.[1]
US Navy Procurement Plan
Navy to Have Three Sea-Going Torpedo Boats
"With the Almost Incredible Speed of 26 Knots"
This is the lead sentence of the New York Times headline article of June 16, 1895, following release of the US Navy Department (Bureaus) plans and specifications. “Incredible” it is not!
1. Beginning in early 1893 the British Admiralty started construction of 42 torpedo destroyers (TBDs) from different builders with differing boiler and engine designs. The first HAVOCK 180 ft LWL, 250 tons, 5000 ihp bult by Yarrow and equipped with locomotive style boilers, in trials bettered 26 knots. HORNET, a follow Yarrow TBD, but equipped with tubulous boilers, achieved 27.628 knots, and 27 knots becomes the speed objective for the program. At the same time a Normand built a 144 ft. French torpedo boat equipped with Du Temple type tubulous boilers also beat 27 knots in trials.[2]
2. It is a disappointment for Secretary Herbert. In April he had directed Chief BuC&R Hichborn to prepare plans for a torpedo boat of 180 tons, speed 27 knots.[3] Previous reports confirmed the Department at work to achieve 27 knots, planning for a vessel of 3500 horsepower, with three boilers, larger engines and increased coal bunker capacity. [4]
Through the summer there are numerous contacts between the Navy and potential bidders for the three torpedo boats. BuC&R inquires on the intentions of specific Pacific, Mississippi River, and Gulf of Mexico shipbuilders. Secretary Herbert makes clear his plan to appoint boards to investigate the yards ability to build the torpedo boats. Likewise, there are many Navy visits to the HMCo (often riding in HMCo-built torpedo boats STILETTO and CUSHING) where the Herreshoff brothers can make their case. Some are attracted by the new composite hull (aluminum, bronze, and steel) America’s Cup DEFENDER (HMCo 452). In early June the Chief BuOrd Commodore Sampson accompanied by CDR Converse in STILETTO, in late June the officers of the Naval War College transported in CUSHING and STILETTO, in July Naval Constructor Hobson to inspect DEFENDER, and in August, about one month before bid opening, Secretary Herbert accompanied by Sampson and Converse witness torpedo shoots by CUSHING and STILETTO. News account of the latter explicitly record Herreshoff’s case - Herreshoff will do for the Secretary what his Bureaus will not do; deliver a torpedo boat guaranteed to attain 27.5 knots. [5] [6] [7]
And finally, to be sure there is no doubt regarding the Herreshoff offer, naval aide to the Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Butler, at the request of Sampson, directs Converse to “find out if the two brothers are agreed on this proposition”, as he suggests they do not always agree.[8]
The Bids and Bid Evaluation
(Bids see Table 1)
Bidder | Class 1 Bureau Plans & Specs | Class 2 Contractor Plans & Specs | Trial Speed Guaranteed for two hours |
|---|---|---|---|
Union Iron Works | San Francisco, CA
| 1 @ $175,000 2 f@ $173,000 each 3 f@ $172,000 each | 26 knots | |
Wolff & Zwicker Iron Works | Portland, OR | 1 @ $168,700 |
| 26 knots |
Moran Brothers | Seattle, WA | 1 @ $163,350 | 26 knots | |
Herreshoff Mfg. Co. | Bristol, RI |
| 1 @ $144,000 2 @ $144,000 each 3 @ $144,000 each | 27.5 knots (Signed contract includes $10K speed penalty if only reach 26.5 knots.) |
Table 1: Bids TBs 6, 7 & 8 Opened September 10, 1895 [9][10]
Chief Naval Constructor Hichborn and Engineer-in-Chief Melville are assigned by the Secretary to assess the bids. Their two-part 17-page report “Memorandum of objections to Herreshoff plans for Gunboats Nos. 6, 7, and 8”[11] , Hull written by BuC&R and Machinery by BuSteam, cites differences from the Bureau Class 1 plans; detailed objections, some of which are negotiated with John Brown Herreshoff in Wash. DC; and ends with conclusions and one recommendation.
● Hull- Notes elimination of the forecastle deck, a bad arrangement of the boilers relative to the adjacent coal bunkers, a general slight reduction of scantlings, elimination of all galvanizing. It concludes many of the changes, “are in the line of cheapening the cost of the boat so that while the price of the bid is considerably lower than the lowest bid under Class 1, much of the difference is due to the fact that the Herreshoff boat is essentially a cheaper boat to construct.”
● Machinery- Objects to the proposed boilers, recommending a return to the Thornycroft used in CUSHING. (Herreshoff apparently, in the effort to reduce weight, proposes an improved square water level boiler.[12]) Cites opposition to the design of various components, objects to “fitting practices as cheap and unsatisfactory”, and notes further deficiencies in the boiler/ fire room arrangements. BuSteam emphasizes, “The contractor must understand that all of his designs for machinery must be submitted to and approved by the Bureau of Steam Engineering.”
● Conclusions
1. The guaranteed speed 27.5 knots is obtained at a lighter displacement than that in the Type 1 Department plans and specifications. Herreshoff makes 27.5 knots at 164 tons displacement as against 26 knots at 182 tons displacement required by Department plans. The Department requirements (they estimate) are equivalent to 27 knots at 164 tons- so Herreshoff promises only a net increase of 0.5 knots.
2. "We are of the opinion the plans submitted by HMCo provide for a boat inferior in general and of a cheaper and less durable character than the boat designed by the Department. It is believed however, that with a satisfactory boiler, and the minor changes hereinbefore recommended, the boats proposed by HMCo will be efficient and useful."
● Recommendation - HMCo build two boats under Class 2. Moran Brothers build one under Class 1.
● Comments on the Conclusions and Recommendation
1. BuC&R and BuSteam use of the pejorative words “cheapening”, “cheaper” and “cheap” intentionally characterize the work as being of lesser quality. No credit is offered for Herreshoff’s demonstrated ability to engineer lower weight steam vessel hulls and machinery.
2. BuSteam comments (highlighted in bold) warn, even threaten, Herreshoff, with continuing, multiple design approval fights for the duration of the contract.
3. Because of Herreshoff’s low price, the Herreshoff / Moran combination is the only option fitting within the $450,000 available from the Congressional authorization and provides the Secretary the rationale to make the award to an East Coast shipbuilder.
Contract Award and the Special Arrangement
On Sept. 27, 1895, CDR Converse advises Capt. Nat in a letter marked “CONFIDENTIAL” the Secretary has awarded HMCo the contract for two torpedo boats, and that “many of the restrictions imposed, contemplated by the original proposals, have been removed… based solely on the remarkably good record made by CUSHING”. See Figure 3 for the complete letter. (Click the images to view larger)
Figure 3 - CDR George Converse Sept. 27, 1895 “CONFIDENTIAL” letter to Capt. Nat
(Source NGH Correspondence Files Halsey C. Herreshoff Collection, Herreshoff Marine Museum)
On Oct. 17 Converse, in his second year as Officer-in-Charge of the Newport Torpedo Station, is assigned additional duty as the “General Inspector” of the torpedo boats to be built at HMCo and Lieut. Spencer S. Wood (later first commanding officer of TB-6) is assigned to HMCo as Converse’s assistant. [13]
It takes one month for the press to expose the “CONFIDENTIAL” arrangement. In a Wash DC dispatch titled, "Building The Torpedo Boats. The Herreshoff's Think They Can Do Better Without Naval Inspectors" the Bristol Phoenix reports on October 25th, following a request by the Herreshoffs, the Secretary has, for possibly the first time in a contract of this magnitude, removed the on-site inspection by a Steam Engineer and a Naval Constructor. Naval Constructors and Steam Engineers are greatly disturbed by this event. [14]
True Feelings of the Bureaus
Chief BuC&R Hichborn may have recommended Herreshoff build two of the torpedo boats, but possibly that is not his true feelings. It is more likely he is forced to that position by the funding reality noted in para #3 of “Comments on the Conclusions and Recommendation”. In his 1895 annual report Hichborn writes, one boat was “awarded” to Moran and the other two were “given” to Herreshoff. [15] “Given” implies the Herreshoff contract was obtained through arbitrary executive action of the Secretary and not through the Navy competitive bidding process with full participation of the Bureaus in the contract decision.
Whatever the feelings of the Bureaus the two Herreshoff boats are built because the Bureau design fails on two counts.
1. The Bureau design is too expensive to build.
2. The Bureau design does not meet the speed desired by the Secretary.
George Converse — A Different Kind of Inspector is Now "In Charge of That Business"
Converse goes right to work. On October 19 he travels to HMCo in CUSHING to begin his new assignment. [16] He has been working with Herreshoff torpedo boat designs since 1875, from model testing through underway trials - LIGHTNING, STILETTO and CUSHING. The TB 6 & 7 contract drawings are general in character and the Navy inspector is required to approve each detail drawing before material is inspected or the work is commenced. In carrying out these duties Converse does not wait for HMCo to submit the finished drawing for approval. Rather he views the drawings in the drafting room, while in preparation, and where he can discuss their merits and suggestions for improvement thereby taking “full advantage of the experience and genius of the designer (Capt. Nat) whose phenomenal success in the production of nearly 200 high speed steam vessels has attracted universal attention.” [17]
As the contract progresses there is continuing friction with the two Bureaus to the extent that Secretary Herbert informs Converse, via an unprecedented letter signed by his naval aide, (Figure 4) that he is “in charge of that business”, to cease communications with the Bureaus, and if advice from the Bureaus is needed, the Secretary will “ask for them.” Then to make clear to the Department his confidence in Converse and to forestall any reprisals by Bureaus against him, he takes the unusual step of recognizing him in the 1896 Annual Report as one “whose remarkable knowledge of his specialties and business capacity has enabled him to render invaluable service to the Dept.” [18]
Navy Department
Office of the Secretary
Feb. 7th, 1896
My Dear Converse-
The Secretary is much pleased with the Armington & Sims letters & I will write to you further about that tomorrow- when I can again get their letters before him as he wishes me to do.
He wants me to tell you that he wants all the correspondence concerning the Torpedo Boats building at Bristol to be addressed to him. In other words he does not want you to be writing to the Bureaus or the Steel Board about details which require their attention. He has placed you in charge of that business- and you can make your own recommendations to him & he says if he wants the advice of the Bureaus’ he will ask for them.
You can imagine that you are not regarded by the Bureaus concerned in the same light the Secretary regards you & how every chance they get they raise some quibble- Every question asked them starts a new argument etc. Anything that you want to get straight to the Secretary send under cover to me or if unofficial send me a private note & I’ll read it to him.
I know that he desires that you are not to be hinderedin your job.
Very Sincerely Yours,
(Signed) Benjamin Buckingham
Figure 4 - Transcript of handwritten letter to CDR George A. Converse US Navy General Inspector TB 6 & 7 building at the HMCo.
Arranged into paragraphs for clarity.[19] [20]
There is no further involvement of BuSteam and BuC&R in TBs 6 & 7. They receive no progress reports, no drawings, nothing until a representative of each participates in the acceptance trials of PORTER (TB-6) in Feb. 1897. In Nov. 1895 Chief Constructor Philip Hichborn issues one of a series of annual reports on recent vessel designs for the U.S. Navy. The Bureaus design of TB-8 is featured, (Figure 5A & Figure 5B). Herreshoff TBs 6 &7 are not mentioned as he lacks detail information on their design. (Click the images below to view them larger.)
TBs 6 & 7 — A Profit or Loss for Herreshoff
L. Francis Herreshoff writes that he believes the boats cost more to build than their contract price, but because of the bonus offered for exceeding contract speed, Herreshoff made “a reasonably good profit.”[21] He is incorrect about the bonus. The Navy stopped offering a bonus for exceeding contract speed with contract award for TBs 3, 4, & 5 in 1894.[22] The answer should be in the HMCo financial records, but they do not survive. Another indicator is Capt. Nat’s annual income as recorded in his diary. They show no financial distress; his income (HMCo salary, HMCo dividends as partner, America’s Cup Syndicate bonuses, plus miscellaneous) triples from 1895 to 1898- starting at $8450 and jumping to $25,000, with the big increase occurring in HMCo dividends. [23]
In Jan. 1896, John Brown Herreshoff writes to Converse, “General Inspector TBs 6 & 7” committing HMCo to sharing the extra cost of “changes proposed in the plans” of the vessels if the Navy cannot obtain the funds from Congress.[24] The “improvements” are not identified until it is all revealed in May 1897 in the fight over the preliminary acceptance trial of PORTER (TB-6). HMCo is seeking an additional $22,000.[25]
1. $13,000 for the change to the Normand boiler
2. $2250 for shafting
3. $1900 for the main engines
4. $4000 for the Navy directed change in the engine guides
We have found no evidence that the claims are paid. John’s letter and other evidence of his trips to see the Secretary or Assistant Secretary Theodore Roosevelt, confirm, that while attempting full cost recovery, they progress on the contract holding back nothing in design and manufacture to beat the performance requirements.
There is another data point; an undated penciled cost estimate in Capt. Nat’s handwriting (Figure 6) for the following torpedo boats;[26]
● TBs 6 & 7 @ 159 tons
● TBs 9, 10 & 11 @ 203.7 tons (30 knot TBs for which HMCo submitted a losing bid)
● 22-1/2 knot TB @ 90 tons [MORRIS (TB 14)]
● 20 knot TB [@ 38 tons TALBOT (TB 15) & GWIN (TB 16)]
Costs are derived by multiplying the major components of ship weight (Hull & Fittings; Machinery; & Equipment) by a factor of cost/ton. Since the 22-1/2 and 20 knot TBs are not identified by hull number, he prepared these estimates between submission of the bids in August 1896 and before contract award with ship numbers assigned in October 1896.
Torpedo Boat | HMCo Bid Price Per Boat [27]
| HMCo Contract Price per boat [28]
| Copt. Nat Cost Estimate Per Boat from Figure 5
|
|---|---|---|---|
6 & 7 | $144,000 | $144,000 | $159,000 |
30 kt, 9, 10 & 11 | 1 boat- $218,000 2 boats-$209,000 3 boats- $206,000 | No award to HMCo | $205,700 |
22.5 knot TB 14 | 1 boat- $84,000 | $85,000 | $87,500 |
20 knot TBs 15 & 16 | 1 boat- $40,000 2 boats- $37,500 | Two boats at $39,000 each | $38,300 |
Table 2 - HMCo Comparison- Bid Price vs Contract Price vs Capt. Nat’s Estimate
For TBs 6 & 7 there is a 10% difference between the contract price and Capt. Nat’s estimate whereas for TBs 14, 15 & 16 there is little difference between the two numbers. The inference is that HMCo may have under bid TBs 6 & 7 as the price of getting back into the torpedo boat business after two straight losses, TB-2, & TBs 3, 4 & 5.
For additional information on torpedo boat pricing during the years HMCo competed, see Appendix A, “A Comparison of Contract Prices of Torpedo Boats 1-18 Awarded Mar. 1888- Oct. 1896.”
Designing & Building PORTER (TB 6) (HMCo. #184)
& DUPONT (TB 7) (HMCo. #185)
1895 is a very busy year. Much of Capt. Nat’s time is taken with the America’s Cup DEFENDER (HMCo 452) contract signed in January. She is a break from the 1893 VIGILANT; deep keel with no center board and the first application of aluminum. Launching the end of June, followed by work ups until the start of racing on July 20. Nat’s involvement in the campaign does not end until final victory September 12th just two days after the TB bid openings.
The competition for the torpedo boats is a must win for HMCo if they are to remain relevant in the business. Capt. Nat makes the time to create a lower weight, lower cost design that he can confidently guarantee 27.5 knots on trials.[29]Much of the details however are left to resolution after contract award. There is much to do; we cover three tasks, development of the hull shape, adoption of a new boiler, and design of a simpler, compact triple expansion engine.
Taking Advantage of Their Technical Strength — The Model Tests for TBs 6 & 7
HMCo Model Testing Background
Part IV of this series summarizes Capt. Nat’s model testing from 1875 LIGHTNING (HMCo 20) through the 30-knot torpedo boat design of 1896. (Latter to be discussed in Part XI.) His most extensive work, the 74 model tests of October -November 1880 determine the hull form of STILETTO and probably influence CUSHING (HMCo 152).[30]CDR. George Converse in his May 23, 1897 letter to Assistant Secretary of the Navy (ASN) Theodore Roosevelt, defending the trials performance of PORTER (TB-6) (HMCo 184), writes that in 1888 for the design of CUSHING (TB-1) “models were again made the subject of experiment and study with the view of determining the form best adapted to speed, and…at the same time possess the greatest maneuvering and sea keeping qualities.”[31] In spite of Converse’s statement we have found no post-1880 record of model tests for CUSHING, or any other vessel, until the October 1895 model testing for TBs 6 & 7.
The U.S. Navy's BuC&R is years behind Herreshoff and the Royal Navy in model testing. They do not conduct open water model testing as practiced by Capt. Nat and only in 1896 do they obtain the first partial funding for an experimental model tank to be constructed at the Wash. DC Navy Yard. Shipbuilders throughout the country express gratification that the US, “was at last in a fair way to be on a par with foreign nations in this important respect.”[32]
October 26, 1895, Model Tests for TBs 6 & 7 [33][34]
The tests are conducted differently than previously. In 1880 models were timed over a 608-foot course. The 1895 tests are conducted over a ½ mile course from the 85-foot LOA steam yacht EUGENIA (HMCo 182) “with staging rigged out ahead to tow from” as in the 1915 arrangement shown in Figure 7.
Figure 7 - Model Tests Oct 15, 1915. The double-ender Model C on the right is used in the 1895 tests to compare with new models E and F that represent two designs for the new TBs 6 & 7. Halsey C. Herreshoff Collection, Herreshoff Marine Museum Scan_913.
The 1880 tests were conducted over several days, the 1895 test is accomplished on a single Saturday minimizing the interference with yard work. Capt. Nat writes the tests are conducted under “favorable conditions” and the Newport Daily News reports the weather fair with variable winds changing from NW to SE and SW in the later afternoon. Because of the changing wind directions, the bay is relatively flat with little wind driven swells. CDR Converse and Lieut. Wood witness the tests. [35]
Nat determines the speed of EUGENIA at three steam pressures (60, 70 and 80 psig.) by running back-and-forth over a ½ mile course and averaging the results. He tests three models.
● Model C (55” L x 6-3/4” B x 3-1/8” D)- Double-ender used in the 1880 tests on the standard end of the beam, proved a better performing model and defined the midship section profile selected for STILETTO.
● Model E (66-1/8” L x 6-21/32” B x 4-3/32” D) New double ender at and below the waterline with plumb stem and stern with sharp waterlines aft. See Figure 8.
● Model F (65-7/8” L x 6-5/8” B x 4-1/16” D) New model with plumb stem and stern, flat stern and full water lines aft.
Models E and F are tested against one another and against Model C at speeds up to the equivalent of 31.8 knots for the full-size vessel. Model E is found to tow 10-18% easier than Model F. He also calculates the resistance and horsepower for a TB 6 & 7 of 176 ft. and 180 tons gross displacement when built to the Model E design.
● @ 26.5 knots- resistance = 27,000 pounds or 2200 hp
● @ 27.5 knots- resistance 28,500 pounds or 2407 hp
● Assuming propulsion machinery efficiency of 62.5%
o @ 26.5 knots 3250 ihp
o @ 27.5 knots 3850 ihp
A Modern Analysis of the Herreshoff Torpedo Boats PORTER and DUPONT [36]
In 2015 Halsey Herreshoff made Towing Model E available to his Webb Institute alma mater for-